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1. Introduction 
"With their Shinkansen trains, the Japanese once inaugurated a renaissance of the railway. 
Now, the Swiss Federal Railways are the first railway to upgrade an entire rail network at one 
swoop” (Benedikt Weibel, NZZ, 19.10.2004). With these words, Benedikt Weibel, then the 
CEO of the Swiss Federal Railways, summed up a forty-year history of modern railway 
development: The beginning of the railway highspeed era in 1964 thanks to Shinkansen, and 
the opening of Rail 2000, the biggest railway enhancement project in Switzerland up to the 
1990s. This paper is about a three-fold story: 1
st
 about the international transfer of ideas, 2
nd
 
about the Swiss way of dealing with high speed, and 3
rd
 about institutional change. In the 
sum, it is the story of the Swiss Federal Railways path to the “Railway of the Future”, as it 
was internationally planned and realized since the 1950s/1960s
2
.  
2. Analytical paradigms for an investigation of railway modernization after 1950 
Three main paradigms or trajectories
3
 can be identified in the debate concerning railway 
modernization in the 1950s and 1960s:1
st
: a high speed paradigm, 2
nd
 an automation or 
cybernetic paradigm and 3
rd
 a market and public service paradigm. With the term “paradigm”, 
I refer to a common conviction of international railway engineers and managers that railways 
should stand up to cars and planes by investing into high speed and into automation. The third 
paradigm came to full fruition in the 1980s and 1990s: It contains the belief that railway 
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companies should be disintegrated – separation between track management and business 
operators for example -, privatized and compete against one another. In the same context, the 
problem of debts was to be resolved: On the one hand by adopting the principles of 
commercial enterprises and on the other hand – at least in the case of Western Europe – by 
settling new agreements with the state: Those kind of traffics which would never be cost-
effective, but which were socially, democratically and also economically still necessary, 
should be subsidized by the state. This was especially the case for commuter traffic. In 
Switzerland, the federalist motive was and is also of high importance: The fact, that all the 
cantons want to equally enjoy the benefits of public (rail) traffic. We can make out an 
international and a trans-European railway-modernization discourse which overlap in some 
areas: Transnational railway organizations and networks such as the International Railway 
Association (UIC) generated shared visions and models for the "European Railway of the 
Future". They were convinced that the expansion of the rail network was a contribution to 
sustainable post-war peace and the political unification of Europe. Such beliefs were also 
expressed in the international rail cybernetics congresses taking place in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In November 1963, a year before the Tokyo Olympic Games and the inauguration of Tokaïdo 
Shinkansen, the UIC held its first Congress on Railway Cybernetics. In his opening speech, 
Louis Armand, secretary general of UIC, declared the will to convert the railway traffic into 
the “most automatic system of the future”4.  For railway engineers, the railway was a 
prototype of a cybernetic system. As railways are bound to tracks of some sort and must be 
managed in a centralized way, the railway system can be defined as “loop” with feedback 
mechanisms. At the 1970s conference in Tokyo, Hiroshi Shinohara, head of the automation 
laboratories of Japanese National Railways, defined the aim of Automatic Train Control as to 
create a “closed loop”, where humans would only supervise and monitor5. The railway 
cybernetic discourse unites three main aspects: First of all, the aspect of general planning and 
prognosis. Second, it is about automation, men-machine-interfaces and safety – also allowing 
for high-speed – and for rationalization purposes. The third aspect refers to the integrative 
driving forces of large technical systems
6
 and infrastructure networks which contribute to 
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state building
7
 and play an important role in national economies. But automation not only 
served to raise the railways’ productivity and safety. It was and is also meant to facilitate 
transnational traffic and border crossing thanks to interoperability. Last but not least, the 
international railway network was also capable to transcend the political boundaries built by 
the Cold War by uniting railway engineers and officials of Western and Eastern Europe, of 
North America and Japan alike. Enhanced safety, interoperability and international 
cooperation were also needed for the greater vision of a high-speed train network in Western 
Europe of which the Swiss railways wanted to be part.  
3. The Swiss path to the “Railway of the Future”  
“The Swiss Railway bound for 2000", such was the headline of a newspaper article in 
December 1969 which reported about the Swiss Federal Railways future plans. The day 
before, SBB had publicly presented their project for a high-speed rail net. In this plan, the 
future traffic time between the major cities Bern and Zurich should be reduced to either 40 
minutes thanks to 200 kmpH traffic speed or even to 30 minutes thanks to 300 kpmH.
8
 At that 
time, maximum speed on Swiss tracks was 120 kmpH. SBB engineers explicitly linked their 
ideas with international projects and plans being discussed one year earlier in an international 
conference on highspeed rail traffic in Vienna (1968). The role model for most of the 
international high speed rail projects was the Japanese Shinkansen, first realized in 1964 
between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka
9
. The Swiss railway innovators also referred to the “excellent 
experiences” made with Shinkansen, when they advocated for major investments and 
changes.
10
 The Swiss “Railway of the Future” as it was designed in 1969, contained the three 
paradigms mentioned above: automation, high speed and market/financial reforms and 
generally a modernized, improved and more attractive railway. The motives for all these 
costly projects were obvious: Railways faced major economic problems from the 1950s 
onwards because of car and air competition mainly, as also Swiss data show: 
Share of railway and private road traffics in %, 1950 to 1980 
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Data source: LITRA traffic data / graph: G. Huerlimann 
In 1950, more than half of Swiss traffic customers would travel by railway, whereas 
somewhat more than one third used private cars and motorcycles. Only ten years later, this 
relation became more than reversed, also due to the improvement of roads and the building of 
a national highway system. The latter, accepted in a federal vote in 1958, also influenced the 
project of a High speed Rail Network. 
This map shows the planned new high speed line between Zurich, the economic, and Berne, 
the political capital of Switzerland: 
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Source: Oskar Baumann (1970), as mentioned above. 
By 1977, these high speed lines were integrated into a whole vision of “New Railway 
Transversal Lines”, encompassing also Alpine base tunnels, as they have been opened in 2007 
on the Loetschberg route and will be inaugurated in 2016 on the Gotthard route, both meant to 
enhance mainly (high speed) transalpine cargo traffic, but also passenger rail traffic. These 
new lines refer to the transnational European network of main and also fast railway lines in 
the 1970s. But instead of having a high speed Shinkansen-network and privatized rail 
companies as in Japan, the Swiss railways nowadays run at a maximum speed of 200 kpmH 
on limited track lines whereas normal maximum speed is 160 kpmH – and SBB is still an 
integrated and state-owned company. So why did the Swiss case develop differently to the 
German railway system with ICE and the privatization of “Deutsche Bahn” or to the Japanese 
case?  
4. Travel reduction thanks to a time table innovation 
Limited space given on the small Swiss territory limits speed in a natural way. Apart from 
that, it invites to conceive the railway network of the whole country as a sort of enlarged 
metropolitan transport area. This was exactly the idea, when a group of young engineers and 
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managers at SBB adapted the Dutch time table model for the densely populated “Randstad” 
area to the Swiss case in the early 1970s
11
. They called their innovation, a fixed interval time 
table type: “rhythmic time table”12. This project which had to initially surmount bureaucratic 
perseverance and risk adversion, was finally introduced in May 1982, when the time table on 
the whole SBB net was changed to a one-hour iteration – in later years, the recurrence interval 
sunk to 30 minutes or even to 15 minutes on shorter distances. 
This time table innovation has allowed for an alternative path for higher transport velocity, 
although this was not the innovators original plan: For in the 1970s, the projected high speed 
lines found severe opposition by land owner sometimes supported by local authorities. But 
more than that, the mere idea of speeding up the main lines did cope neither with the Swiss 
democratic spirit nor with federalist realities or with overall planning ideas: Since the 1940s, 
the planning ideal was to avoid major metropolitan areas and instead foster a chain of 
settlements ranging from major cities to small towns. All of them had to be well accessible 
and equipped with infrastructure networks. So the public, democratic consultation of the SBB 
project for “New Railway Transversal Lines” clearly yielded a negative result and showed 
that SBB and the federal authorities had to redesign their project if they wanted to avoid a 
defeat at the ballot box. The solution consisted in improving the whole railway net instead of 
concentrating investment onto a set of high speed lines. This also responded to the ecological 
turn in the 1970s/1980s and to the “Zeitgeist”- preference for “the local”. Finally, SBB also 
changed their marketing strategy from a technocratic imagery to focussing on the “citizen’s 
benefit”: In 1985, a leaflet showing Swiss people of different age and social class, in working 
and leisure clothes, advertised for Rail 2000, as was the new title for the redesigned 
infrastructure project. The slogan said: “More railway(s) for everybody!” And marketing 
worked: On 6.12.1987, the project Rail 2000 won a majority of voters ready to invest more 
than 5 billion CHF into the biggest railway improvement and building project until the 1990s 
– with the integrated fixed interval time table as a guiding principle for planning and 
investment. 
But Rail 2000 still did involve some building of new and straighter tracks, because distances 
between major cities had to be abbreviated and brought into a one-hour distance. Tilting trains 
and/or automatic train control (ATC), which allows to lower the signal headway, were also 
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put into operation where new tracks met too much opposition or were too costly. Rail 2000 
was developed from 1987 until 2004, when it’s “first stage” was officially completed. Since 
then, various new strategies for a railway for the 21
st
 century or, as it is termed now, the 
“Future Development of the Railway Infrastructure”, have been debated, developed and 
secured with several popular votes in the 1990s granting billions of Swiss francs for these 
projects and for the “New Rail Link through the Alps” (NRLA), consisting of the above 
mentioned Alpine base tunnels. This important approval by voters and taxpayers already 
explains partly why SBB is still an integrated and public company. 
5. Institutional change “Swiss style”  
Why should one disintegrate and privatize the national symbol – as SBB has been ever since 
the nationalization of the former private railway companies in 1902? Even less so, when 
(almost) everybody thinks it works well. The last serious demands for a full privatisation of 
SBB date back to 2008. Nowadays, even liberal economists hold that a “going public of SBB” 
seems “not realistic” in the “short-run and in the medium term” – instead, a “full 
privatisation” is seen as “very long term” aim.13 Even the demands of the current SBB 
management for more bargaining power and autonomy in tariff setting are met with 
opposition by a large alliance of regional politicians, passenger and cargo lobbies, 
consumerism activists, the Federal Price Controller and private businesses. So what do 
management and institutional reforms look like? The liberalisation steps for the European 
Single Market converged with the demands for a liberalisation of the service sector (WTO 
Uruguay round 1986, GATS 1995) also influencing the Swiss railway traffic policy. Although 
Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, the European reform agenda was to a 
certain degree in accordance with Swiss economic liberalisation policy, with some important 
exceptions: Switzerland has fairly known any state industries as its “liberal corporatism” 
(Peter Katzenstein) has provided a balance between public and private business interests. 
Therefore unlike some other countries, Switzerland did not undergo a major privatisation 
process from the1980s onwards. This is important when considering institutional change at 
Swiss railways: First of all, the railway reform process taking place between 1996 and 1999 
introduced the commissioning principle. It means that cantonal authorities commission and 
pay for freight service and for local commuting transport whereas the long distance lines 
should work on a profitable base. Secondly, regional passenger traffic and transnational cargo 
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were both opened for international (European) competition. Third point: SBB underwent a 
series of managerial reforms since the 1980s and was transformed into a public limited 
company according to a special federal law in 1999. The reform also wrote-off SBB’s debts. 
In 2009, SBB became a corporation with four company divisions forming SBB Group. But 
SBB Ltd. continues to be owned by the Swiss Confederation, which holds 100% of SBB’s 
shares up to this day. Apart from the obvious “success story” of SBB investments – expressed 
in the share of passenger kilometres and the number of transport customers as shown in the 
graphs at the end of this article – the veto points of federalism and direct democracy are an 
important explanation for the not-yet-full privatisation of SBB. These two institutions will 
sternly oppose any attempt which potentially creates regional imbalance and threatens the 
security and quality of public service. Apart from that, the very dense fixed interval timetable 
which integrates also the public tram, bus and ship transport and which is completed by the 
integral tariff community of all public transport carriers, creates a socio-technical path 
dependency: There is hardly any room for passenger rail competitors on the same tracks. 
Above all, the Swiss rail business case fares better than most of the other ones in Europe and 
(almost) as well as the Japanese case.  
The Swiss solution is one of a state-owned company – SBB – which has undergone a series of 
managerial reforms and produced a number of successful innovations, next to the 44 so called 
private railway companies majority-owned by the Swiss cantons and the Confederation. Japan 
has gone a different way with the privatisation of Japanese Railways in 1987. But the 
outcome looks remarkably similar as these two graphs show: 
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Source: Railway Statistics Synopsis/LITRA 2010  
